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By DREw  FUDENBERG AND ERIC MASKIN* 
The theory  of repeated  games  has been an 
important  tool for understanding  how coop- 
eration might arise in a population  of self- 
interested  agents. If the prisoner's  dilemma, 
as depicted  by the following  matrix, 
C  D 
C  2,2  -1,3 
D  3,-1  0,0 
is played only once, the unique  equilibrium 
is for both players  to play  D, resulting  in the 
inefficient  payoffs  (0,0). If, instead,  the game 
is repeated infinitely  often and the players 
are not too  impatient, there are "cooper- 
ative" equilibria  in which both players al- 
ways play C for fear that failure to do so 
would cause the opponent  to "punish"  them 
with D in the future. 
Although repeated  play permits  coopera- 
tion as an equilibrium,  it does not preclude 
less cooperative  outcomes.  Indeed,  it is also 
an equilibrium  for both players to use the 
strategy "always play D." More generally, 
the Folk Theorems  establish  that any feasi- 
ble individually  rational  payoffs  can arise  in 
an equilibrium  if the players  are sufficiently 
patient. (See  Robert Aumann and Lloyd 
Shapley, 1976; Ariel Rubinstein,  1979; and 
our 1986 article.)  In our version  of the pris- 
oner's dilemma,  a payoff  vector  is individu- 
ally rational  if each player's  payoff is posi- 
tive. 
However, not  all  these  equilibria are 
equally plausible. Specifically,  there is  a 
widespread intuition that often the most 
likely equilibria  are those whose payoffs  are 
efficient,  and efficiency  is typically  assumed 
in economic  applications  of repeated  games. 
In fact, selecting  the efficient  equilibria  is an 
approach  sometimes  taken  for games  in gen- 
eral (see John Harsanyi  and Reinhard  Sel- 
ten, 1988). But the intuition for efficiency 
seems particularly  strong for the case of 
repeated  games. 
Herein we provide  support  for this intu- 
ition. For a  class of  repeated games that 
includes the prisoner's  dilemma, we show 
that efficiency  is implied  by evolutionary  sta- 
bility if there is a small  probability  that the 
players  make "mistakes,"  so that their real- 
ized actions are sometimes  different from 
those they intended. 
The evolutionary  process  we have  in mind 
is one in which pairs of strategies  from a 
population are matched  at random  to play 
the repeated  game, and a strategy  has equal 
chances  of being assigned  the role of players 
1  and 2.  If  a  strategy performs well on 
average  against  the population  (i.e., its aver- 
age payoff is comparatively  high), the frac- 
tion of the population  corresponding  to that 
strategy  grows; by contrast,  the proportion 
for a low-payoff  strategy  declines.  In biologi- 
cal settings, such a process  results  from the 
relative  advantage  that a successful  strategy 
has in  reproducing  itself. In economic or 
sociological  applications,  evolution  may de- 
rive from learning:  if players  try out strate- 
gies on an experimental  basis and one works 
well against  the population,  more and more 
players are likely to adopt it (as word gets 
around),  whereas  a poor strategy  will proba- 
bly be abandoned. 
A strategy  is evolutionarily  stable  (ES)  if it 
can ultimately  dominate.  That is, following 
John Maynard Smith (1982), it cannot be 
"invaded"  by any mutant strategy.  An ES 
strategy  must be a "best response"  to itself, 
because a mutant playing  a better response 
would have a higher  average  payoff. More- 
over, for strategy  s to be ES, there  cannot  be 
a mutant s'  that does better than s  does 
against a  population consisting of  a  high 
proportion  of s's and a small  proportion  of 
s5s. 
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Robert  Axelrod  and  William  Hamilton 
(1981) showed that the strategy "always D" 
is not ES in the repeated prisoner's dilemma 
with time-average (undiscounted) payoffs. In 
particular, always D  can be invaded by the 
strategy  "tit-for-tat"  (that  plays  C  in  the 
first period, and then always plays the same 
action  as its  opponent  played the previous 
period). Tit-for-tat can invade because it does 
as well against always D  as always D  does 
against itself  (a time-average of  0), and tit- 
for-tat  obtains  a  payoff of  2  when  paired 
against itself. 
Although  evolutionary stability rules out 
always D, the uncooperative outcome can be 
approximated  arbitrarily closely  by  an  ES 
strategy profile.  For  example, consider  the 
strategy "Play C in periods 0, n, 2n,...,  and 
D  in  all other periods, so long as past play 
has always conformed to this pattern; if past 
play  has  not  always conformed, then  play 
D  forever  afterwards." Call  this  strategy 
"mostly D." For large n, mostly D is nearly 
as uncooperative as always D. Yet it is ES, 
because if an invader deviates from the pat- 
tern, it is punished forever and so obtains a 
time-average payoff of at most 0. In contrast, 
mostly  D  obtains  2/n  against itself.  If  the 
proportion  of  mutants is  sufficiently small, 
even a mutant that attains an average of  2 
when paired against itself cannot overcome 
this punishment. Thus evolutionary stability 
by  itself  has  almost no restrictive power in 
the repeated prisoner's dilemma. 
The first step in our argument is the obser- 
vation  that mostly  D  performs quite badly 
(payoff 0) against itself if one of the players 
deviates  from  the  prescribed  pattern  by 
"mistake." This suggests that, if mistakes are 
possible,  evolution  may  tend  to  weed  out 
strategies  that  impose  drastic penalties  for 
deviations. We then exploit the idea that, if 
punishments  are not  too  drastic, it  is  rela- 
tively  easy  for  inefficient  strategies  to  be 
invaded by  efficient ones, since the penalty 
for trying to initiate efficient play against an 
inefficient opponent is not large. 
To formalize the notion of a small proba- 
bility  of  mistake,  we  suppose  that  each 
player's expected payoff conditional on there 
never  being  a  mistake  is  lexicographically 
more  important  than  his  expected  payoff 
conditional on one mistake, which in turn is 
more important than his payoff conditional 
on  two  mistakes, and so on. In this paper, 
we  consider  only  the  class  of  symmetric 
two-player  games, which includes  the pris- 
oner's  dilemma  and  also  the  well-known 
"battle  of  the  sexes." We also assume that 
players use strategies of only finite complex- 
ity:  those  that  can  be  implemented  by  a 
finite  computer  with  a  finite memory. We 
show  that if,  as in  the prisoner's dilemma, 
there is a unique payoff pair that maximizes 
the  sum  of  players' payoffs,  then  any  ES 
(pure) strategy must be efficient. If there are 
multiple pairs that maximize the sum of the 
payoffs,  then  ES  does  not  imply  efficiency 
but  still  imposes  restrictions on  the  set  of 
equilibrium payoffs. 
I.  Symmetric Repeated Games with Noise 
We consider a symmetric two-player game. 
Hence,  both  players choose actions from a 
common (finite) set A, and we can express a 
player's  payoff  as  u(a, b),  where  a  is  his 
own action and b that of his opponent. For 
future reference let v = minb maxa u(a, b) be 
a player's minmax payoff and let V = Convex 
Hull{(vl,  v2)lthere exists (a, b) with u(a, b) 
= v1 and u(b, a)  =  v2}  be the set of feasible 
payoffs. 
We are interested in the infinitely repeated 
game  where  the  above  one-shot  game  is 
played  in  each period  t = 0,1,....  We sup- 
pose  that  a  player's  realized  action  a'  is 
sometimes  different from  the  action  a  he 
intended  (so  that  the  realized  action  is  a 
noisy  signal of  the one intended), and that 
payoffs in each period depend only on real- 
ized actions. (Alternatively, we could assume 
that intended and realized actions never dif- 
fer, but that a player's action might be mis- 
perceived by his opponent. In this case, pay- 
offs would  depend on both actions and the 
noise  creating  the  misperception.) Further- 
more,  a  player  observes  just  his  oppo- 
nent's realized action, not the intended one. 
Thus a player's public history at time t, de- 
noted  h(t),  is  the sequence [(a^(O),  b(O),..., 
(a^(t-1),b(t-1))],  where the  a's  and  b's 
are his own and his opponent's realized ac- 
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date 0 equal to the null set.) History h(t)  has 
length, denoted by l(h(t)),  equal to t. Let H 
be the space of  all histories. Note  that each 
sequence of play generates two histories, one 
for each player. For each h E H, let 'n(h) be 
the  corresponding  history  for  the  other 
player, that is,  g(h)  is obtained by permut- 
ing  a(T)  and  b(T)  for each T.  We use this 
formulation  so that, when players use sym- 
metric strategies, we can denote them both 
by  the  same  map  s:  H -4  A.  For example, 
for either player the strategy tit-for-tat in the 
repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  can  be  ex- 
pressed as follows: for all h e  H, s(h)  = C if 
l(h)  = 0;  and s(h)  = b(l(h)-  1) if  l(h)  > 0. 
We will restrict attention to pure strategies 
that depend only on the public history. 
We shall assume that players use strategies 
of only finite complexity. A formal definition 
of this concept is introduced by Ehud Kalai 
and William Stanford (1988). Informally, as 
we indicated in  the introduction, a strategy 
of  finite complexity is a finite program that 
can be run on a finite computer with bounded 
memory. Most familiar strategies are of this 
form,  including  all  the  repeated prisoner's 
dilemma strategies mentioned above. 
A  pair of  finitely complex strategies v= 
(s, s')  gives  rise  to  a  sequence  of  play 
[(a(O), b(O)),(a(1), b(1)), ... ] (the a's and b's 
correspond  to  the  players using  s  and  s', 
respectively)  that  eventually  repeats  itself 
(i.e.,  forms  a  repetitive cycle). We  suppose 
that  players  do  not  discount,  that is,  they 
maximize  their  time-average  payoffs.  A 
player's time-average payoff from v  (contin- 
gent on there being no mistake) is 
T 
v(,)  =  lim  (1/T)  ;  u(a(t)  b( 
T  - oo  t  t=O 
Let  v(41h)  be  a  player's  expected  payoff 
from  v  conditional  on  history h  occurring, 
where  l(h)  =T.  That  is,  if  [(&(X),TbQ)), 
(T(  +  ?1)  b(T  + 1)),...]  is  the  sequence  of 
action pairs induced by v  after history h, 
T +  T 
v(olh)  =  lim  (1/T)  E  u(a^(t),b(t)). 
T-  oo  T 
To  compute  the  expected  payoff  condi- 
tional on one mistake requires a probability 
distribution  on  when  mistakes  occur.  For 
our results, we can accommodate any distri- 
bution  with  the properties that, conditional 
on  each mistake, each player has a positive 
probability of making it and each period has 
a  positive  probability  of  being  the  one  in 
which  it  occurs. For  m=1,2,...,  let  vm(j) 
be a player's expected payoff conditional on 
there having been  m  mistakes. By conven- 
tion,  v0(v) = v(). 
We call vm(4)  a player's "mth-order"  pay- 
off  from  the  strategy pair  v.  Our  lexico- 
graphic assumption implies that, for any two 
pairs  a and  J, if  m < m' any difference be- 
tween  vm(v)  and  vm0(lv)  outweighs a differ- 
ence between  vm'(4) and vm  (J) in a player's 
performance. As we mentioned, this formal- 
izes the idea that mistakes are improbable. 
The  strategies constructed in  the  papers 
cited above on the Folk Theorem extend to 
our "noisy" repeated game, so that for any 
payoff vector (v, v) E V with v ?  v there is a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium whose  payoffs 
contingent on no mistakes are (v, v). We will 
see  that considering ES strategies consider- 
ably restricts the set of equilibrium payoffs. 
II. Evolutionary  Stability 
As  described informally in  the introduc- 
tion, a strategy s is ES if no other strategy s' 
can invade a population consisting of a large 
fraction  of  s's  and  a  small proportion of 
s"s. We shall suppose that the proportion of 
s"s,  although  small,  is  big  relative  to  the 
probability  of  a  mistake. Hence,  given  the 
lexicographic preferences we have assumed, 
s' can invade even if it performs worse to the 
mth-order against s  than s does itself, pro- 
vided  that  s'  fares better to  a lower order 
against itself than s does against s'. 
Formally, s is evolutionary  stable provided 
that, for all finitely complex strategies s',  if 
there  exists  m*  such  that  vm(s', s')  = 
Vm(S,  s')  for  all  m <im*,  then  there  exists 
m** < m* such that 
(*)  vm  (S,s)  ?vm**(S  fs) 
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Furthermore, if  vm*(S', s') > Vm*(s,  s')  then 
(*)  is strict. 
This  definition  reduces  to  the  standard 
one  (see Maynard Smith) if  the probability 
of  mistakes  is  literally zero.'  In  that case, 
only preferences to the 0th order matter, and 
so  s'  can  invade  only if  either it  performs 
strictly better  than  s  does  against  s,  or it 
performs equally well but fares strictly better 
than s against s'. 
We shall say that payoff vector (v, v') E V 
is  efficient if it maximizes the sum of play- 
ers'  payoffs  on  the  set  V  (i.e.,  (v, v') E 
argmax(  "P){u  ?  u'I(u,  u') E V}).  A strategy 
s  is  efficient if  (v(s,  s), v(s, s))  is  efficient. 
Note  that  the  sum  of  payoffs  is  relevant 
because, as we discussed, a strategy has an 
equal chance of being assigned either player's 
role. 
THEOREM 1:  Let u =  min  ulthere  exists u' 
such  that  (u, u')  is  efficient}.  If  a finitely 
complex strategy s  is  ES,  then v(s, s) ? u. 
Thus if there is a unique  efficient  pair (u*, u*), 
v(s,  s)  =  u*. 
PROOF: 
Note  first  that,  for  any  history  h, 
(v(s,  slh), v(s, s1T(h))) E V.  Because  s  is 
finitely complex,  there is  a  history h*  that 
minimizes  v(s, slh).  We  claim  that  there 
exists  v' such that (v(s,  slh*), v') is efficient. 
If  not,  then  in  particular  (v(s,  slh*), 
v(s,s1T(h*)))  is  inefficient.  Choose  a  se- 
quence  of  action  pairs  {(a*(t),  b*(t))}t=O 
whose  time-average  payoffs  are  efficient. 
Fix  actions  a  #  s(h)  and  b #  s(v(h), 
(s(v(h)),  a))  (where (v(h),  (s(v(h)),  a))  is 
the history  T(h) followed by the action pair 
,g(a, s(v(h)))  = (s(v(h)),  a).  Let  s'  be  a 
strategy that coincides with s expected after 
histories h* and  T(h*).  After h*, define s' so 
that it plays a  for two periods. If the oppo- 
nent  plays  b  in  the second period after h* 
(i.e.,  in  period  l(h*)+l),  s'  plays  the  se- 
quence {  a*(t)}  beginning in the third period 
after  h*  (i.e.,  in  period  l(h*)+2,  it  plays 
a*(O), in period l(h*)+3  it plays a*(1), etc.). 
If  the  opponent  fails  to  play  b  in  period 
l(h*) +1,  then s' coincides with s beginning 
in period l(h*)+2.  After  7T(h*),  define s' so 
that it plays s(7T(h*)) the first period (i.e., in 
period  l(7T(h*))). If the opponent plays a in 
that first period s' plays b in the next period 
(period l(T(h*)) + 1), and subsequently plays 
the sequence  {b*(t)}  (i.e., it plays  b*(O) in 
period l(T(h*)) + 2, b*(1) in period l(7T(h*)) 
+ 3, etc.). If the opponent fails to play a  in 
period  l(7T(h*)), s'  coincides with  s  there- 
after. 
We will show that s' can invade. We first 
claim that 
(1)  v (s',  slh*)  = v (s,  slh*). 
By our choice of h* and because s' reverts to 
s  after  h*  if  its  opponent  does  not  play 
according to s',  v(s', sIh*) ?  v(s, sIh*). Now 
if  this last inequality is strict, let  s" be the 
strategy that coincides with s'  after h* and 
otherwise coincides with s. Then v(s", slh*) 
> v(s, sIh*), and so if  m* is the number of 
"mistakes"  that  must  occur if  (s, s)  gives 
rise to h*,  Vm*(S",  s)  >  vm*(S,  s).  But by def- 
inition  of  s",  vm(s", s)  =  vm(s, s)  and 
Vm(S//,  s") = vm(s, s") for all  m < m*. Thus, 
s" can invade, contradicting the evolutionary 
stability  of  s.  We  conclude  that  (1)  must 
hold. 
Because s'  plays like s  after 7T(h*)  unless 
its opponent plays according to s', 
(2)  v(s',sjg(h*))  =v(s,sj7T(h*)) 
and  v (s,  slh*)  = v (s,  s'lh*). 
Now,  by  choice  of  s',  v(s',  s'lh*) + 
v(s', s'1T(h*))  is  efficient. Hence,  from  (1) 
and  because  there  exists  no  v'  such  that 
(v(s,  slh*), v')  is  efficient,  v(s',  s'lh*) + 
v(s',  s'lIr(h*)) >  v(s', slh*) +  v(s,  s'jI(h*)). 
But fron  (1)  and (2)  this last inequality is 
1Actually  it  reduces  to  something  slightly  weaker 
than the standard definition. According to the latter, s 
is ES provided that, for all s',  v(s, s) > v(s', s)  and, if 
this holds with equality, then v(s, s') > v(s', s').  When 
mistakes  have  zero  probability, we  (like  Axelrod  and 
Hamilton) deem s  to be ES even when the last inequal- 
ity is weak. However, given the noise in our model, this 
discrepancy may well be an artifact of our no-discount- 
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equivalent to 
(3)  v(s',  s'lh*) + v(s',  s'jr(h*)) 
> v(s,  s'lh*) + v(s,  s'lrT(h*)). 
Now  (1), (2), and (3) imply that 
(4)  vm*(s  s'), >VM*(s, S) 
and  vm*(s5  s)  = VM*(s,  S). 
Our choice of s' implies, moreover, that 
(5)  vm(s', s)  = vm(s,s')  = vm(s'  s) 
=vm(s,s)  for m<m*. 
But  from (4)  and  (5) we  infer  that  s'  can 
invade, contradicting the evolutionary stabil- 
ity of s. 
We conclude that there must exist v' such 
that (v(s,  sIh*), v') is efficient after all. The 
theorem follows from the definition of  h*. 
Because (2,2) is the unique efficient payoff 
pair in  the  prisoner's dilemma, Theorem 1 
implies that any finitely complex ES strategy 
must give rise to the cooperative outcome in 
the repeated game. The qualification " finitely 
complex" is, however, important. For exam- 
ple, consider the following infinitely complex 
strategy s?: "alternate between D  and C; if 
either  player  deviates  from  this  pattern, 
switch  to  one  in  which  C  is  played  only 
every third period; if either player deviates 
from this pattern, switch to one in which C 
is  played  only  every  fourth  period,  etc." 
Strategy s?  is ES because, regardless of  the 
history, any attempt to deviate from (so, so) 
is  always  punished  by  having one's  payoff 
reduced by a positive amount. (For a finitely 
complex strategy, by contrast there must al- 
ways be a history after which further devia- 
tions  no  longer  reduce one's  payoff.)  But 
(so,s?)  results in the inefficient payoffs (1,1). 
Indeed,  evolutionary  stability does  not  re- 
strict  the  Folk  Theorem  payoffs  at  all  if 
infinitely complex strategies are possible. 
Even for finitely complex strategies, Theo- 
rem 1 does  not necessarily imply efficiency, 
TABLE 1-MODIFIED  BATTLE  OF THE  SEXES 
a  b  c  d 
a  0,0  4,1  0,0  0,0 
b  1,4  0,0  0,0  0,0 
c  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0 
d  0,0  0,0  0,0  2,2 
as  we  noted  earlier. Consider the modified 
version of  the battle of  the sexes shown in 
Table  1. Theorem 1 rules out  only  payoffs 
less  than  1  in  the  repeated game  (which, 
however, is still considerably more restrictive 
than the Folk Theorem, which permits pay- 
offs as low as zero). Indeed, as the following 
converse of Theorem 1 establishes, any feasi- 
ble payoff greater than 1 can arise from ES 
strategies. 
THEOREM  2:  Let u be defined as in Theo- 
rem 1. If  (v, v) E Vand v>  max{v,u},  then 
there exists a finitely complex ES  strategy s 
such that v(s, s) = v,  provided there exists a 
finitely complex strategy with these payoffs. 
Rather than prove this theorem in full gener- 
ality,  we  shall  simply exhibit  ES strategies 
for the prisoner's dilemma and modified bat- 
tle of  the sexes. In the former, consider the 
following modification of tit-for-tat: "play C 
the  first period and thereafter play  C  in  a 
given period if and only if either both play- 
ers played C or both played D  the previous 
period."  Observe that continuation payoffs 
are always efficient: a mistake triggers a sin- 
gle  period of  "punishment" and then a re- 
tum  to cooperation. Note  that tit-for-tat it- 
self is not ES, because a mistake will trigger 
the (inefficient) infinite cycle (C, D)  (D, C), 
(C, D)  and so on. In the modified battle of 
the sexes, consider the strategy "Play d  the 
first period and subsequently play d as long 
as in  every past  period either both  players 
played  d  or  neither did. If  a single player 
deviates from d, then henceforth that player 
plays  b  and  his  opponent  plays  a."  Even 
though this strategy is not efficient, it is ES, 
since  any  attempt  to  promote greater effi- 
ciency will be punished forever; the punish- 
ments  are  stable  because  the  strategies at 
that point form an efficient equilibrium all of 
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III. Extensions 
In  this  paper  we  have  assumed no  dis- 
counting, infinitesimal noise, pure strategies, 
symmetry  across  players,  and  equilibrium 
configurations where only a single strategy is 
played. The intuitive reasons behind our re- 
sults, however, seem quite general, and so in 
a  forthcoming paper we expect to  relax all 
these  assumptions.  Our work builds  on  an 
extensive  literature, but,  for lack  of  space, 
we  must also  postpone  discussion of  previ- 
ous work to the sequel. 
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